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MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND LEGAL
CULTURE: WHAT A DIFFERENCE SIXTY
YEARS MAKES
Jack Goldsmith*
Cass R. Sunstein**
President Bush's Military Order of November 13, 2001 es-
tablished a legal framework to enable military commissions to
try terrorists associated with the attacks of September 11, 2001
on Washington, DC, and New York City.1 This Military Order
was greeted with impassioned criticism in the press, the legal
academy, and Congress. But it hardly lacked precedent. Sixty
years earlier, in the midst of World War II, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt (FDR) established a Military Commission to
try eight Nazi agents who had covertly entered the United States
to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism. Although the Nazis
failed in their mission, their aims were similar to those of the
9/11 terrorists. And yet Roosevelt's creation of the Commission,
and the subsequent secret trial of the Nazi saboteurs, received
widespread praise from the same institutions that protested
Bush's action.
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** Karl N. Llewellyn Dist. Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Chi-
cago. We thank Ryan Goodman, Dennis Hutchinson, Bernard Meltzer, Eric Posner,
Richard Posner, Peter Spiro, Laurence Tribe, Detlav Vagts, Adrian Vermeule, G.E.
White, and Ben Wittes for helpful comments, and Sarah Rispin for outstanding research
assistance.
This article was completed before Professor Goldsmith took a leave of absence to
serve as Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Defense.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
1. Technically the reach of the Military Order was somewhat broader than this,
see note 92, but the defining cases clearly involved those associated with the September
11 attacks.
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Our purpose here is not to investigate, except in passing, is-
sues of law and policy.2 We instead explore three other ques-
tions: What explains the dramatically different reactions? What
lessons do the different reactions offer about changes, over time,
in the legal culture and in culture in general? What lessons do
they offer about the evolution of protections for civil liberties in
general and during wartime in particular?
The most tempting, and common, explanation for the dif-
ferent reactions is that there is a significant difference in law-
that President Roosevelt's Order stands on much firmer legal
ground than President Bush's Order. We show that this and re-
lated explanations are weak. The different reactions are instead
best explained in terms of two large differences between the
United States of 1942 and the United States of 2001. In 1942,
the nation perceived a far greater threat to its own survival; for
this reason Americans were far less solicitous of the interests of
defendants thought to have participated in a war effort against
the United States. But this explanation is inadequate by itself.
It must be supplemented with an understanding of the large-
scale, post-1960s shift in American attitudes, involving decreased
trust of executive and military authority, and a strengthened
commitment to individual rights in the legal system and broader
culture. Our general claim is that with respect to these issues,
the legal culture is fundamentally different from what it was be-
fore, so much so that many previous practices are barely recog-
nizable. We use the different reactions to the Bush and Roose-
velt Military Orders as a way of obtaining a window on this shift.
After making out these claims, we conclude with some gen-
eral reflections on the evolution of civil liberties protections dur-
ing wartime. In particular, we identify a mechanism behind the
trend toward greater protection for civil liberties during war-
time, namely: A judgment, in hindsight, that past civil liberty in-
trusions were unnecessary or excessive. We also suggest that
this trend is, in a way, an accident of America's distinctive his-
tory.
2. The relevant legal issues have been discussed in many places. See, e.g., Neal K.
Katyal and Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribu-
nals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259 (2002); George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution: Bush's
Military Tribunals Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, The American Prospect 26,
(Jan. 1, 2002); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of
Military Commissions, 5 Green Bag (2d) 249 (2002).
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I. THE NAZI SABOTEURS AND THE REACTION TO
ROOSEVELT'S ORDER
On June 12, 1942, six months after Hitler declared war
against the United States, four Nazi agents who had traveled by
submarine from France landed in darkness on a beach in Long
Island, New York.' A few days later, four more Nazi agents
landed on the north Atlantic coast of Florida. The eight men
had all lived in America before returning to Germany after Hit-
ler rose to power; two of them, Herbert Haupt and Ernest Bur-
ger, were naturalized American citizens.4 The saboteurs' mis-
sion was the brainchild of Hitler himself, who wanted to cripple
U.S. military production capacities and demoralize the Ameri-
can civilian population. Their task was to blow up aluminum
plants, railroad lines, canal locks, hydroelectric plants, and
bridges. They also had plans for "nuisance bombings" of rail-
road terminals and Jewish-owned department stores.5
Soon after their arrival in the United States, two of the
saboteurs, Dasch and Burger, decided to betray their mission to
the U.S. government. It is unclear why they turned. Most histo-
rians believe they were motivated by fear of betrayal by the
other saboteurs, or by fear of detection by U.S. officials. What-
ever their reason, Dasch and Burger telephoned the FBI office
in New York to announce their plot. When they were dismissed
as cranks, Dasch traveled to Washington, where FBI agents took
his story more seriously. The FBI interviewed Dasch for five
days about the saboteurs' plans, and then rounded up his seven
accomplices.
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover announced the capture of the
eight Nazi Saboteurs on June 27, 1942. Hoover insinuated that
the arrests resulted from the FBI's infiltration of the Nazi sys-
tem. But he revealed little actual information beyond the names
of those involved, how they landed, the weapons they possessed,
and their sabotage aims. Nonetheless, the nation reacted to the
news with enormous joy. "The little that [Hoover] told was
enough to make headlines of a size that had hitherto been re-
served for the war's major battles.... With no information
about how the success had been achieved, the public took the
3. Unless otherwise indicated, the following account of the Nazi saboteur ordeal is
based on Eugene Rachlis, They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi Saboteurs in Amer-
ica 3 (Random House, 1961); and David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. S. Ct. Hist.
61 (1996).
4. See Rachlis, They Came to Kill at 22, 57 (cited in note 3).
5. Id.
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news as undeniable proof that Nazi fiendishness was no match
for American G-men.
' 6
The newspaper reports of the saboteurs' capture insisted
that the eight men would face the death penalty. Within the
government, however, there was considerable uncertainty about
how to prosecute and punish the saboteurs. One complicating
factor was that the laws applicable in civilian trials did not per-
mit the death penalty for the non-U.S. citizen defendants. An-
other was a concern that Article III of the Constitution required
the government to try the American citizens for treason.
"If there was doubt in the Justice Department, there was
none among politicians, the press and most of the public."7 Al-
most everyone seemed to call for the saboteurs' execution-the
sooner the better. The Washington Post reported that
"[d]emands immediately arose among members of Congress for
swift justice to the saboteurs-for the death penalty if the law
permits it."8 The general public favored death for the saboteurs
by a 10-1 margin. A Newsweek essay entitled Death for the
Saboteurs argued that "[w]e ought to meet this threat with the
most swift and the most ruthless punishment which the law per-
mits."' "Life Magazine headlined its story of the capture: The
Eight Nazi Saboteurs Should Be Put To Death."'1
President Roosevelt agreed. "Offenses such as... these are
probably more serious than any offense in criminal law," he
wrote to Attorney General Biddle on June 30. "The death pen-
alty is called for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war
aim and the very existence of our American government. [The
saboteurs] should be tried by court martial."' 2 Biddle concurred
that a military commission is preferable because of greater flexi-
bility, its traditional use in cases of this character and its clear
power to impose the death penalty. 3
6. Id. at 169-70.
7. Id. at 173.
8. Felix Cotton, Death Penalty Asked for 8 Captured Spies, Wash. Post 2 (June 29,
1942).
9. Contemporary polls, American Institute of Public Opinion, as reported in Week
in Review, N.Y. Times, Section IV, 2 (Aug 2, 1942).
10. Raymond Moley, Perspective: Death for the Saboteurs, Newsweek 64 (July 6,
1942).
11. Rachlis, They Came to Kill at 173 (cited in note 3).
12. FDR Memorandum to Biddle, (June 30, 1942), cited in Danelski, 1 J. S. Ct.
Hist. at 65 (cited in note 3).
13. Biddle Memorandum to FDR (June 30, 1942), cited in Danelski, 1 J. S. Ct. Hist.
at 66 (cited in note 3).
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On July 2, Roosevelt issued two proclamations that together
established a Military Commission to try the eight saboteurs.
One proclamation established the jurisdiction of the Military
Commission and purported to preclude judicial review of its de-
cisions. 14 The other named the eight defendants as well as the
judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. It also outlined the
structure of the Commission in very general terms."i
Roosevelt's announcement that a Military Commission
would try the saboteurs "met with general satisfaction in Wash-
ington, as it will throughout the country," wrote Lewis Wood,
the New York Times Washington correspondent. 6 "The Presi-
dential action calmed the fears of many who realized the delays
and technicalities incident to civil trials."' 7  A few days later,
Wood wrote: "Expectation.., that the Administration would
seek the death penalty for the Hitler spies before the military
commission chosen by the President sounded a heartening note
at a moment when indignant Americans everywhere were de-
manding this extreme punishment for the audacious criminals.
Americans wanted to hear the roar of rifles in the hands of a fir-
ing squad, and the government has apparently agreed that this is
the proper course." s 8
14. The proclamation provided that:
[a]ll persons who are subjects, citizens, or residents of any nation at war with
the United States or who give obedience to or act under the direction of any
such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the United
States or any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary de-
fenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit
sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war, shall
be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that
such persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any pro-
ceeding directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought
on their behalf, in the courts of the United States, or of its States, territories,
and possessions, except under such regulations as the Attorney General, with
the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe.
7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942).
15. See 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942) ("The Commission shall have power to and
shall, as occasion requires, make such rules for the conduct of the proceeding, consistent
with the powers of military commissions under the Articles of War, as it shall deem nec-
essary for a full and fair trial of the matters before it. Such evidence shall be admitted as
would, in the opinion of the President of the Commission, have probative value to a rea-
sonable man. The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the Members of the Commission
present shall be necessary for a conviction or sentence. The record of the trial including
any judgment or sentence, shall be transmitted directly to me for my action thereon.").
16. Lewis Wood, Army Court to Try 8 Nazi Saboteurs, N.Y. Times 1, 3 (July 3,
1942).
17. Id.
18. Lewis Wood, Nazi Saboteurs Face Stern Army Justice: Order For a Military
Trial Comes as National Anger at Invasion Rises, N.Y. Times, Section IV, 6 (July 5, 1942).
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The saboteurs' trial began on July 8 on the fifth floor of the
Justice Department in a room whose windows were covered in
heavy black curtains to block all daylight. Major General Frank
McCoy, the Commission's presiding officer, closed the trial to
the press and public due to the nature of the testimony, which
involves the security of the United States and the lives of its sol-
diers, sailors and citizens. 19 McCoy released "communiqu6s"
about the trial that contained adjournment times and other
meaningless bits of information. He also let reporters view the
empty trial chamber, and he released photographs of the trial
and the defendants. But other than this, the trial process took
place in complete secrecy.
Although the Washington press corps complained about
this secrecy,' ° many, and perhaps most, commentators did not
object to it. Arthur Krock of the New York Times dismissed
claims for open press coverage of the trial as "thoughtless."'
'
The Nation noted that "[a]lien sabotage trials are obviously rich
in information that can be of value to the enemy, particularly to
other saboteurs still on the loose. '22 In this light, it viewed the
''meaningless communiques" emerging from the trial as a "vic-
tory" for the press.23
The next piece of real public information about the Com-
mission came three weeks later, when the Supreme Court an-
nounced that it would convene a special summer session to en-
tertain the saboteurs' habeas corpus petitions challenging the
legality of the military commission. Congress and the public
were outraged by the Court's intervention. "The decision to
seek recourse in the Supreme Court did not meet popular ap-
proval in Washington," reported the New York Times. "On the
contrary, there is great dissatisfaction here with the length to
which the [three-week military trial] has already proceeded....
On all sides hope was expressed that the Supreme Court would
make short work of the move., 24 The Los Angeles Times be-
lieved that "[s]uch a hearing was totally uncalled for.... The
Supreme Court should never have been dragged into this war-
19, Id.
20. See Rachlis, They Came to Kill at 177 (cited in note 3).
21. Arthur Krock, Editorial, In the Nation: When Martial Law Was Proposed for
Everybody, N.Y. Times 18 (July 14, 1942).
22. In Shape of Things, The Nation 41 (July 18,1942).
23. Id.
24. Lewis Wood, Supreme Court is Called in Unprecedented Session to Hear Plea of
Nazi Spies, N.Y. Times 1, 10 (July 28,1942).
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time military matter., 25 The Detroit Free Press agreed: "Realism
calls for a stone wall and a firing squad, and not a lot of holier-
than-thou eyewash about extending the protection of civil rights
to a group that came among us to blast, burn, and kill.",26 So too
did the Communist Daily Worker. "The unprecedented action,"
it said, "is in itself a victory for the enemies of America and the
United States.,
2 7
Some newspapers were more supportive. Arthur Krock,
who had earlier claimed that the secret military trial was legiti-
mate and fair, saw the Supreme Court's intervention as a fine
service to democracy at war. "Whatever disposition the Court
shall make of the grave issues presented to it, the fact.. .will
brighten the American history of a time when Cicero's apo-
thegm-'inter anna silent leges'21-is the rule in almost every
other land."2 9 The Washington Post, also a supporter of the mili-
tary commission, defended Supreme Court review, noting that
"the very circumstances that the Court is meeting to hear the pe-
tition-this after a long and exhaustive trial of the men by a mili-
tary commission- shows that the saboteurs are being given their
day in court." The Post added that "in a time when in so many
parts of the world law has become a mockery and justice an ob-
scenity, it will hearten freemen everywhere that here in this cita-
del of liberty law and justice still function-even for the benefit
of those who surreptitiously invaded our land to do us injury. 30
On July 31, 1942, the Supreme Court announced in a
unanimous per curiam order that the Military Commission was
legally constituted and thus that the petitioners' were lawfully
detained. The Court did not provide reasons for its conclusion,
but indicated that it would do so at a later time.
Most commentators viewed the Court's hurried review of
the Commission approvingly. The New York Herald Tribune
described the Court's action as a victory for civil liberties:
The action of the Supreme Court was of real importance to
the American people as a whole... [The Court] affirmed the
right of the President to deny the civil courts of this country to
25. Michal Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implica-
tions of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 Mil. L. Rev. 59, 69 (1980).
26. As quoted in Rachlis, They Came to Kill at 249 (cited in note 3).
27. Id.
28. "In the time of war, the laws are silent".
29. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Issues of Law and Fact in Sabotage Case, N.Y.
Times (July 30, 1942).
30. Editorial, Habeus Corpus, Wash. Post 12 (July 31, 1942).
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those acting under enemy orders who... [violate] the laws of
war. In other words, it gave no comfort to the guilty. But by
the fact of their intercession the justices of America's highest
court reaffirmed to innocent Americans that the law still
stands as a shield over them, against malicious usurpation or
the quick tempers and brash judgments of war time.
In all this court drama, American was showing the world that
its judicial system could give even an enemy invader a sport-
ing chance to prove his innocence; even in war time we re-
garded as important the rights of the individual and did not
shoot him offhand, as Nazi Germany would have done.
32
The Washington Post similarly stated:
In denying civil justice to the eight Nazi saboteurs, the Su-
preme Court did the expected thing.... To handle [the sabo-
teurs] in the civil courts would be to help Hitler immensely,
and that would be intolerable. We cannot afford to give our
enemy, in our present pass, the slightest assistance. At the
same time we are engaged in delivering the world from a tyr-
anny in which the rights of the individual have no place.
Those rights are enshrined in our reign of law. If we simply
disregard the law, even in our treatment of our enemies, we
shall be in danger of coming out of the war as Hitlerian as
Hitler. That is why the admittance of the petitions for writs of
33habeas corpus to the Supreme Court was widely approved.
The Nation was also Supportive, though somewhat more
impatient:
A touch of the ludicrous is a small price to pay for main-
taining the traditions of American judicial procedure. What-
ever the fate of the Nazi invaders who landed on our beaches
in the middle of June we need not begrudge them a few extra
weeks of life involved in giving them a more fair trial. The ni-
ceties of jurisprudence, however, can be carried too far, and in
this case the procedure was beginning to take on such over-
tones of fantasy that the Supreme Court's refusal to give the
defendants standing in the civil courts came in the nick of
time. . . . Had the Supreme Court granted [the saboteurs'] pe-
titions, American soldiers would have to go into battle with
John Doe summonses in place of rifles and a round of sub-
poenas in their cartridge belts. But the Supreme Court held
31. Editorial, A Welcome Opinion, N.Y. Herald Tribune 10 (Aug 1, 1942).
32. Week's Editorial News Events: America's Judicial System Tested, N.Y. Herald
Tribune, Section II, 3 (Aug. 2, 1942).
33. Editorial, Saboteur's Case, Wash. Post 8 (Aug 1, 1942).
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firm, and Ringling Brothers need not worry about having to
turn Gargantua loose on a writ of habeas corpus.
34
Unbenkownst to the public, the Military Commission trial
ended three days after the Supreme Court announcement, on
August 3, 1942. The Commission found all eight defendants
guilty, recommended that they all be executed, and sent the
3,000-page record to the President for review. On August 8,
President Roosevelt publicly announced that he had approved
the commission's judgments but had commuted the sentences of
Burger and Dasch (the turncoats) to life and thirty years impris-
onment, respectively. By the time of the public announcement,
the executions had been carried out.
In their post-mortems, the major news organizations praised
the Military Commission for its fairness and integrity, the Su-
preme Court for its quick review and approval of the Commis-
sion's legality, and the entire process as a victory for democracy3V-
and justice. The Washington Post's analysis was typical:
Americans will read with grim satisfaction the news that six of
the eight Nazi saboteurs have been executed. [... ] It was
hardly surprising, under the circumstances, that many an im-
patient voice was raised regarding the seeming laggardness of
the procedure that was being followed and many an impatient
demand was made that the culprits be summarily executed.
That certainly was what would have occurred in Germany un-
der similar circumstances. But drum-head trials and summary
executions are not the American way. The very enormity of
the crime these eight saboteurs had committed made it all the
more essential, not for their sake but for ours, that their guilt
be established beyond peradventure of a doubt, that they be
given the benefit of able counsel, that all the facts be fully re-
viewed. All this was done. It was bound to take time. Yet,
actually, justice was swift and sure. A month after the mili-
tary commission first convened the verdict of this distin-
guished tribunal was carried out. Nothing was lost by this
punctilious procedure. But Americans can have the satisfac-
tion of knowing that even in a time of great national peril we
did not stoop to the practices of our enemies. And those who
may seek to follow in the steps of the eight will be under no il-
34. The Shape of Things, The Nation, 103 (Aug 8,1942).
35. Some, to be sure, were critical. Norman Cousins, for example, viewed the trial
as "an ostentation out of democratic procedure" that made a "farce out of justice." Nor-
man Cousins, The Saboteurs, The Sat. Rev. of Lit. 8 (Aug 8, 1942).
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lusion as to what is in store for them if they are caught. 3 6
The New Republic stated that the process revealed that "even in
wartime and even toward the enemy we do not abandon our ba-
sic protection of individual rights. '37  The New York Herald
Tribune, in an editorial entitled "Justice has Been Done," as-
serted:
No one can suggest that these men, [...] despite the tension of
a terrible war, did not receive a full and fair trial. Nor, on the
other hand, can it be said that the issue of the trial has jeop-
ardized the safety of the nation. American principles of jus-
tice have been vindicated in the eyes of the world.
38
Even the condemned Nazis acknowledged that they had "been
given a fair trial" and that their military lawyers had "repre-
sented our case as American officers unbiased, better that we
could expect and probably risking the indignation of public opin-
ion. 3
9
Almost three months after the saboteurs were executed, the
Supreme Court released its unanimous opinion-Ex Parte
Quirin 40-explaining why the Military Commission was constitu-
tionally valid. The Court first interpreted Roosevelt's preclusion
of judicial review to permit review on habeas corpus. It then
reasoned that Congress had authorized the use of military com-
missions to try violations of the laws of war, and that at least
some of the acts allegedly committed by the defendants consti-
tuted such violations. 2 The Court distinguished a leading Civil
War precedent, Ex Parte Milligan,43 which had held that a U.S.
civilian charged with conspiracy against the federal government
could not be tried by a military commission when federal courts
were "open to hear criminal accusations and redress griev-
ances."44 Quirin held that Milligan involved an individual who
was not an enemy belligerent and thus not subject to the laws of
war.
45
36. Editorial, Justice is Done, Wash. Post, Sec. B, 6 (Aug 9, 1942).
37. Editorial, The Saboteurs and the Court, New Republic 159 (Aug 10, 1942).
38. Editorial, Justice Has Been Done, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Section II, 8 (Aug 9,
1942).
39. See Rachlis, They Came to Kill at 297-98 (cited in note 3).
40. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
41. Id. at 24-25.
42. Id. at 26-29.
43. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
44. Id. at 121-22.
45. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942).
270
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The announcement of the Court's opinion in Quirin was re-
ported with little fanfare. We found no editorial commentary
about the opinion in any of the mainstream periodicals men-
tioned above. The ACLU's Wartime Civil Liberties Reports
covering the years 1942 and 1943, which contained lists of "de-
plored" and "regretted" civil liberties violations by government
officials (including the Supreme Court), failed even to mention
Quirin.46 Moreover, the legal commentary that emerged in the
law reviews in the years following Quirin, generally "applauded"
the decision.47 "Because most legal commentators agreed with
what the Chief Justice was trying to accomplish, they found un-
objectionable both the Quirin ruling and the way which he had
justified it."'48 In the context of the events of late 1942, the deci-
sion in Quirin to limit Milligan and to uphold the validity of
Roosevelt's Military Commission was not viewed as a big deal.
II. 9/11 AND THE REACTION TO THE BUSH
MILITARY ORDER
The reaction to President Bush's Order to establish Military
Commissions was much different from the reaction to Roose-
velt's. The public supported the Bush Military Commission pro-
posal by a greater than 2-1 margin.4 ' Though significant, this
support is more ambiguous and less enthusiastic than the public
support Roosevelt received in 1942. But the real differences in
reaction were in Congress and especially the mainstream press
and members of the legal academy. These institutions reacted
with vehement, and sometimes strident, opposition. The New
York Times typified the reaction of many newspapers:
46. See ACLU, The Bill of Rights in War (1942); ACLU, Freedom in Wartime
(1943).
47. Belknap, 89 Mil. L. Rev. at 88 (cited in note 25). In support of Belknap's con-
clusion, see, for example, Cyrus Bernstein, The Saboteur Trial: A Case History, 11 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 131 (1943); Robert E. Cushman, Ex Pane Quirin et al-The Nazi Saboteur
Case, 28 Cornell L.Q. 54 (1942); George Schilling, Saboteurs and the Jurisdiction of Mili-
tary Commissions, 41 Mich. L. Rev. 481 (1942); Note, 17 Tulane L. Rev. 475 (1943);
Note, 31 Geo. L.J. 90 (1942). For more critical contemporary perspectives, see Edward
S. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution 118 (Alfred Knopf, 1947); Charles Barber,
Trial of Unlawful Enemy Belligerents, 29 Cornell L.Q. 53 (1944).
48. Belknap, 89 Mil. L. Rev. at 88 (cited in note 25).
49. In a survey conducted by NPR News, the Kaiser Family Foundation and Har-
vard University's Kennedy School, 64% answered "'yes," and 26% answered "no," to the
question "Do you favor or oppose military tribunals for non-citizens suspected of terror-
ism who are captured outside the United States or arrested inside the nation's borders?"
See NPRIKaiser/Kennedy School Poll on Civil Liberties, as reported in NPR, Poll: Secu-
rity Trumps Civil Liberties (Nov 30, 2001), available at <http://www.npr.org/news/ spe-
cials/civillibe r tiespoll/01 1130. poll. html>.
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President Bush's plan to use secret military tribunals to try
terrorists is a dangerous idea .... In his effort to defend
America from terrorists, Mr. Bush is eroding the very values
and principles he seeks to protect, including the rule of law.
The administration's action.. .do[es] an end run around the
Constitution.... [B]y ruling that terrorists fall outside the
norms of civilian and military justice, Mr. Bush has taken it
upon himself to establish a prosecutorial channel that answers
only to him. The decision is an insult to the exquisite balanc-
ing of executive, legislative and judicial powers that the fram-
ers incorporated into the Constitution. With the flick of a pen,
in this case, Mr. Bush has essentially discarded the rulebook
of American justice painstakingly assembled over the course
of more than two centuries. In the place of fair trials and due
process he has substituted a crude and unaccountable system
that any dictator would admire.... Using secretive military
tribunals would ultimately undermine American interests in
the Islamic world by casting doubt on the credibility of a ver-
dict against Osama bin Laden and his aides. No amount of
spinning by Mr. Bush's public relations team could overcome
the impression that the verdict had been dictated before the
trial began. Reliance on tribunals would also signal a lack of
confidence in the case a~ainst the terrorists and in the nation's
democratic institutions.
The New York Times dismissed the Roosevelt precedent for
military tribunals as "an embarrassing skirting of the legal proc-
ess." Other prominent newspapers reacted in a similar fash-
ion. 2
Many members of Congress also reacted critically to the
Order. Democratic representative Conyers, the ranking mem-
ber of the House Judiciary Committee, called the order "a civil
liberties calamity" that puts "the executive branch in the unat-
tainable role of legislator, prosecutor, judge and jury., 53 Repre-
sentative Kucinich described the Bush Order as "Kafka's The
Trial writ large," and added that "we should not let the actions
of terrorists cause us to reject our American system of justice.,1 4
50. Editorial, A Travesty of Justice, N.Y. Times A24 (Nov. 16, 2001).
51. See also Editorial, Justice Deformed: War and the Constitution, N.Y. Times,
Week in Review, Section IV, 14 (Dec 2, 2001).
52. See, e.g., Editorial, An Un-American Secrecy, L.A. Times, Section B, 24 (Nov.
17, 2001); Editorial, Military Justice (Continued), Wash. Post A24 (Nov. 26, 2001).
53. See Lawmakers Criticize Bush's Order for Military Tribunals, 11/16/02, avail-
able at <http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/1/1 6/inv.tribunals>.
54. Press Release of Representative Kucinich, November 15, 2001, available at
<http://www.house.gov/Kucinich/press/pr-011115-tribunals.htm>.
HeinOnline  -- 19 Const. Comment. 272 2002
2002] MILITARY TRIBUNALS & LEGAL CULTURE 273
Representative Bob Barr, the conservative republican from
Georgia, stated the "executive order takes your breath away, if
you read the details of it."55 Democratic Senator Leahy accused
the Bush administration of ignoring "the checks and balances
that make up our constitutional framework," adding that it im-
properly "cut out Congress in determining the appropriate tri-
bunal and procedures to try terrorists," and "sends a terrible
message to the world that, when confronted with a serious chal-
lenge, we lack confidence in the very institutions we are fighting
for. 1156
Finally, the legal academy came out strongly against mili-
tary commissions. Most strikingly, a letter to Senator Leahy,
drafted by Yale Law School professors and students, and signed
by over 700 law professors and lawyers, claimed that Bush's Or-
der authorized the creation of institutions that were "legally de-
ficient, unnecessary, and unwise." It added that Bush's Military
Order "undermines the tradition of [s]eparation of [p]owers"
because, in contrast to Roosevelt's Commission, which was
based on an "express[] grant[]" of legislative authorization, the
Bush Order was "without congressional approval." The letter
added that "the use of military commissions would be unwise, as
it could endanger American lives and complicate American for-
eign policy." The letter concluded: "The proposal to abandon
our existing legal institutions in favor of such a constitutionally
questionable endeavor is misguided. Our democracy is at its
most resolute when we meet crises with out bedrock ideals intact
and unyielding."57 Many law professors echoed the same themes
in editorials across the country. 8
55. Joyce Howard Price, Unlikely Allies Fight Federal Anti-Terror Initiatives, Wash-
ington Times (Nov. 11, 2001).
56. George Lardner, Jr., Democrats Blast Order on Tribunals: Senators Told Mili-
tary Trials Fall Under President's Power, Wash. Post A22 (Nov. 29, 2001).
57. See Yale Letter dated 12/5/2001, at <http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/
PublicAffairs/152/Leahy.pdf.> (last visited 7/23/02).
58. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Bush Can't Operate as a One-Man Act, L.A. Times
M5 (Dec. 16, 2001); George Fletcher, War and the Constitution: Bush's Military Tribunals
Haven't Got a Legal Leg to Stand On, The American Prospect 26 (Jan. 1, 2002); Patricia
Williams, War and the Law: The Dangerous Patriot's Game, The Observer 26 (Dec. 2,
2001); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should be Tried Before the World, N.Y. Times
A23 (Nov. 17, 2001); Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for Bin Laden, N.Y.
Times A39 (Nov. 23, 2001); Judith Resnick, Invading the Courts: We Don't Need Military
Tribunals to Sort Out the Guilty, Legal Times: Law and Lobbying In the Nations Capital
34 (Jan. 14, 2002).
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III. WHY THE DIFFERENT REACTIONS?
The reaction to President Bush's Military Order presents
the following puzzle. In 1942, FDR's creation and use of a mili-
tary commission was widely viewed as legitimate, appropriate,
constitutionally valid, authorized by Congress, consistent with
American democratic and rule-of-law values, protective of civil
liberties, and helpful to the war effort. In 2001, Bush's Order to
establish military commissions was widely viewed (at least
among elites) to be illegitimate, inappropriate, unprecedented,
unauthorized, unconstitutional, undemocratic, violative of basic
civil liberties, harmful to the war effort, and self-defeating. Why
were the seemingly similar Military Orders greeted with such
different elite reactions?
A. UNPERSUASIVE EXPLANATIONS
We begin with four explanations that have some surface ap-
peal but that cannot, we believe, explain the different reactions
to the Roosevelt and Bush Orders.
1. Domestic Legality
Many people, including some distinguished professors of
law, have argued that Congress granted Roosevelt the authority
to establish military commissions to try Nazi saboteurs, while
President Bush's Order lacked congressional approval.59 On this
view, the reason for the different reactions lies in significant dif-
ferences in the legal basis for the two orders. But there are no
such differences. The Bush Order was premised on 10 U.S.C.
§821, which states that the creation of statutory jurisdiction for
court martials does not "deprive military commissions.., of
concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses
that.., by the law of war may be tried by military commis-
sions. 6 ° Roosevelt's Order was premised on the identically-
worded predecessor to this statute, Article 15 of the Articles of
War-the very statute that a unanimous Supreme Court in
Quirin held was "explicit[]" congressional authorization for the
President to establish military commissions.6'
59. See Yale Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy (cited in note 57).
60. 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
61. See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28-9 (1942) ("By the Articles of War, and es-
pecially Article 15, Congress has explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do
so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the
law of war in appropriate cases."); id. ("Congress [in Article 15] has authorized trial of
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Far from being on more tenuous ground than the Roosevelt
Order, one could plausibly argue that the Bush Order is on
firmer legal ground in light of the relevant precedents. When
Roosevelt created his Military Commission, the leading prece-
dent was Milligan. Bush's military commissions, by contrast,
could rely on the more recent, more supportive, and probably
more relevant Quirin precedent. Because Quirin was on the
books when Bush created his commissions but not when Roose-
velt created his, Bush's commissions have stronger grounding in
Supreme Court precedent.
In addition, although Quirin held that Congress had af-
firmatively authorized military commissions in Article 15 of the
Articles of War, Article 15 is probably best read merely as a
congressional refusal to abroate a prior non-statutory jurisdic-
tion for military commissions. . The Quirin Court thus may have
erred in concluding that Congress had, at the time of the Quirin
decision, authorized the President to establish military commis-
sions. But Congress re-enacted Article 15 in 1950, recodifying it
at 10 U.S.C. §821 against the background of the Quirin interpre-
tation. The legislative history to this reenacted provision sug-
gests that Congress was aware of, and accepted, Quirin's inter-pretation of the provision.63 And this, in turn, makes it more
plausible today than at the time of Quirin that Congress has in
fact authorized the President to establish military commissions.
Hence the Bush Order has two bases of support that the Roose-
velt Order lacked: Quirin itself and a clearer congressional au-
thorization.64
offenses against the law of war before such commissions.").
62. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 350-
55 (1952); see also statement of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Brig. Gen.
Enoch H. Crowder, S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong. 1st Sess. 53, 40-41 (1916) (in context of
Article 15, asserting that military commission "has not been formally authorized by stat-
ute," but noting that Article 15 was designed to make clear that the "common law of war
jurisdiction was not ousted"); Madsen, 343 U.S. at 353 (referring to General Crowder's
testimony concerning Article 15 as "authoritative").
63. See Sen. Rpt. 486, Establishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. at 13 (June 10, 1949) ("The language of [Article of War] 15 has been preserved
because it has been construed by the Supreme Court. (Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942))."); H. Rept. 491, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. at 17
(April 28, 1949) (same).
64. Some have sought to limit the Quirin holding by arguing that it rested not only
on Article 15 concerning a law of war violation, but also on Articles 81 (relieving the en-
emy) and 82 (spying). See Katyal and Tribe, 111 Yale L.J. at 1281-90 (cited in note 2). It
is true that charges were brought against the saboteurs under Articles 15, 81, and 82. But
three passages in Quirin suggest that the Court thought-rightly or wrongly-that Arti-
cle 15 itself authorized military commission trials for violations of the law of war:
A. "By the Articles of War, and especially by Article 15, Congress has explic-
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Our point here is not to argue that Bush's Order was in fact
on firmer legal ground than Roosevelt's. There are other issues
that may affect the legality of the two commissions in different
ways. 61 Our point is simply to show that differences in the legal-
ity of the two commissions simply cannot explain the differences
in reaction to them. In fact, we believe that far from explaining
the different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush orders, the
perceived legal differences between the two orders are a product
of those different reactions. During World War II, the weaker
points in the Executive's position did not receive thorough criti-
cal scrutiny, to say the least. By contrast, skepticism about the
Bush Order resulted in intense concern with the legal technicali-
ties and a high degree of doubt about plausible legal arguments.
The very fact that some people now doubt and seek to confine
the reasoning of Quirin66 attests to our basic claim: A decision of
a unanimous Supreme Court, welcomed at the time, is now seen,
in many quarters, as an alarming and even dangerous precedent.
itly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall
have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropri-
ate cases."
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28.
B. "Congress has authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before
such commissions."
Id. at 29.
C. "The reference in the 15th Article of War to 'offenders or offenses that...
by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions,' Congress has
incorporated by reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all
offenses which are defined as such by the law of war."
Id. at 30. Maybe doubts remain, after these passages, about whether Article 15 (rather
than Articles 81 and 82) is the basis for the decision. But those doubts seem to be re-
duced when we consider that the Court focused its entire analysis not on spying or har-
boring, but on acts of intended sabotage that violate the laws of war. And at the end of
the opinion, the Court notes that it has "no occasion now to define with meticulous care
the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according
to the laws of war. It is enough that petitioners here ... were plainly within those
boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with
being enemies who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered, or
after entry remained in, our territory without uniform-an offense against the laws of
war." Id. at 45-46. This charge-the only charge included in the holding-could not
have been based on Articles 81 and 82. It could have been based only on Art 15.
65. For example, Congress declared war in World War II but authorized the war
against the al Qaeda terrorists on September 14, 2001. There is a debate about the extent
to which a declaration of war is a necessary prerequisite to a military commission. Com-
pare Katyal and Tribe, 111 Yale L.J. 1259(cited in note 2) (arguing that it is a prerequi-
site) with Bradley and Goldsmith, 5 Green Bag 2d (cited in note 2) (arguing that it is
not).
66. See, for example, Katyal and Tribe, 111 Yale L.J. 1259 (cited in note 2)
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2. International Legality
Another potentially relevant difference between 1942 and
2001 can be found in international law. In 1955, the United
States ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection
of Prisoners of War, and in 1992 the United States ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR").
Neither of these treaties was in force in 1942; both of them po-
tentially affect the legality of the Bush Military Order under in-
ternational law. Can the Bush Order's possible illegality under
international law explain the differences in reaction?
We doubt it. The main reason is that the severest reactions
to the Bush Order, in November and December 2001, were
premised on violations of American constitutional and civil lib-
erties traditions, and not on violations of international law. For
the most part, the people who criticized Bush's Order did not in-
voke the Order's potential international law difficulties. When
complaints based on international law arose in early 2002, they
did so mostly in connection with the treatment of "detainees" in
Guantanamo, not with respect to military commissions. Interna-
tional law arguments have remained at the periphery of the de-
bate within the United States about the legality of military com-
missions.
Moreover, it is hard to see how the international law
changes affect the validity of the military commissions, as op-
posed to the procedures the commissions must employ. Assum-
ing that the Geneva Convention applies to the al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees (a contested point), the Convention contem-
plates the use of military commissions, and thus does not call
their legality per se into question." Thus a broad-scale dismissal
of military commissions (as opposed to commission-related
complaints about access to counsel and federal appellate review)
could not be based on the Geneva Convention. As for the
ICCPR, it says nothing about military commissions. While it
does guarantee certain basic procedural rights such as the right
to choose counsel and be presumed innocent,68 it also recognizes
that a state party to the treaty may "derogate" from these obli-
gations if it certifies that an emergency affecting the safety of the
nation so requires.6 9
67. See Geneva Convention III, Article 84.
68. See ICCPR, Article 14.
69. See id., Article 4. As of this writing, the United States had neither used a mili-
tary commission nor attempted to derogate from the ICCPR.
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Once again our point is not to argue that the Bush Order
was in fact legal under international law, for this claim raises
many complicated issues that are far beyond our concern here.
Our point is simply that whatever the validity of the interna-
tional law objections to military commissions, differences in in-
ternational law in 1942 and 2001 do not adequately explain the
different reaction of elites in the United States.
3. FDR v. Bush, Biddle v. Ashcroft
In 1940 FDR was elected to his third term in a landslide in
1940; in 2000 Bush won controversially and lost the popular
vote. Attorney General Biddle was a well-respected establish-
ment figure; he was also a member of the ACLU and NAACP,
and was in general "revered by liberals."7° Attorney General
Ashcroft, while an establishment figure in many ways, is viewed
with suspicion by the civil liberties left and some on the libertar-
ian right. In the 1940s, actions by the Executive branch met with
a much greater presumption of approval, at least within elite cir-
cles. Perhaps there is a kind of heuristic at work in the contem-
porary reaction. If Bush and Ashcroft are in favor of doing
something that might be objectionable from the standpoint of
civil liberties, some people might think it reasonable to assume
that the action is, in fact, objectionable from that standpoint. A
similar heuristic may have been at work in the 1940s. If Roose-
velt and Biddle were in favor of doing something that might be
objectionable from the standpoint of civil liberties, many people
thought it reasonable to assume that the action is not, in fact, ob-
jectionable from that standpoint. The heuristic does the work of
a more fine-grained analysis.
We think that this difference has some explanatory value.
Distrust of Bush and Ashcroft by some elites was hardly irrele-
vant. But the point is insufficient by itself. Counterfactuals are
notoriously hazardous, but imagine, for example, if a President
Gore and his Attorney General (Reno? Tribe?) were responsi-
ble for a military order akin to that issued by President Bush.
The critical reaction would have been diminished in some circles,
but it would have been increased in others. We strongly suspect
that it would have been far closer to the reaction to the Bush
Order than to the Roosevelt Order.
70. Geoffrey Perrett, Days of Sadness, Years of Triumph, The American People,
1939-1945 at 358 (Coward, McCann, Geoghegan, 1985). See also Richard W. Steele, Free
Speech in the Good War 119 (St. Martin's Press, 1999).
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4. The Question of Guilt or Innocence.
There were many salient differences between the authoriza-
tions for the Roosevelt and Bush military commissions. Roose-
velt's was much briefer than Bush's. Unlike Bush's, Roosevelt's
applied to U.S. citizens. But Roosevelt's had a far narrower
scope. It applied only to persons who entered the United States
to commit sabotage and related acts. Perhaps most important,
Roosevelt's authorization specifically named the eight saboteurs
who would be tried by Military Commission. The Bush Order,
by contrast, applied not just to al Qaeda members and others
who committed terrorist acts against the United States, but also
to anyone who "aided or abetted" the commission of terrorist
acts or "knowingly harbored" terrorists. And it did not include
the names of any persons who would be tried before military
commissions.
The important point is that it was clear from the beginning
who would be tried before the Roosevelt Military Commission.
The defendants were in hand and widely known to be saboteurs;
there was no real doubt about their guilt; and their names were
included in the set of proclamations establishing the Commis-
sion. By contrast, the persons to whom the Bush Order might
apply, and their factual guilt, remain uncertain. We speculate
that the critical reaction to the Bush Order would have been
radically diminished if it applied only to people who were al-
ready under arrest for helping to plan the September 11 attack.
One of the palpable concerns of the critics is that military com-
missions might convict the innocent. 71 There was no serious
question about the essential guilt of those tried before Roose-
velt's Commission. And there is a psychological point as well: A
vivid sense of the identity of the perpetrators could well heighten
the sense that an expeditious proceeding is appropriate, and un-
der the right conditions, such a sense could also weaken the pro-
tests of those who insist on what they see as procedural require-
ments.
But again, this cannot be the whole picture. Here as else-
where, counterfactuals are notoriously hard to assess. But is it
plausible to think that military commissions would have been
uncontroversial in 2001 and 2002 if the defendants were identi-
fied, were in custody, and were widely viewed to be guilty? It
71. See, for example, Editorial, Military Justice (continued), Wash. Post (cited in
note 52) (urging that under military tribunals "innocent people likely will be convicted
and punished" because "[t]he nature of the rules almost guarantees mistakes").
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might well be that the identification of the perpetrators would, in
many circles, have fortified the insistence on the need for an or-
dinary civil trial. We think that the most important and instruc-
tive differences lie elsewhere.
B. BETrER EXPLANATIONS
We now turn to two explanations that we think better ac-
count for the differences in reaction in 1942 and 2001.
1. Differences in War Context
The capture of the Nazi saboteurs was one of the first pieces
of good news in an unprecedentedly large-scale war that had not
gone well during the first half of 1942. The future of the Nation
was at serious risk, and everyone was aware of that fact. World
War II was a "total war" that mobilized the entire Nation.
Nearly everyone had relatives or acquaintances involved in the
fighting, and tens of thousands of Americans had been killed or
captured by the summer of 1942. On the home front, there were
daily reminders of the war, including rubber shortages, gas ra-
tioning, and wage and price controls. Most people had a genuine
fear of invasion by the Japanese on the west coast; and on the
east coast German submarines had sunk hundreds of ships. Eve-
rything was disrupted; all of life was changed. There was no am-
biguity about whether the Nation was at war, or about whether
the nation's survival was at stake.
The events following 9/11 are much different- certainly
thus far. 9/11 has required relatively few sacrifices or changes in
American life. There is a general (though diminishing) fear
among the population. And there have been (relatively minor)
disruptions at airports. But we have seen none of the mobiliza-
tion and sacrifice (or call to sacrifice) that characterized World
War II, and the United States has suffered only a comparatively
small number of military casualties. The main imperative to the
civilian population following 9/11 was not "sacrifice," but rather
"spend." Many continue to question whether military action is
an appropriate response to 9/11, whether we can truly be at
"war" against non-state actors like al Qaeda, and whether the
9/11 attacks represent a true threat to the Nation's survival.
These radical differences in war contexts unquestionably
help explain the different reactions to the 1942 and 2001 Order
establishing military commissions. For those who view the
stakes to be lower now than they were perceived to be in 1942, it
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is altogether natural to question the wisdom of military commis-
sions. Of course it would be extreme to suggest that the Nation's
prospects for success in World War II would have been seriously
compromised by the use of ordinary civil courts. But in 1942, the
widespread perception of a threat to national survival made it far
harder for people to insist on the use of those courts. For better
or for worse, solicitude for the interests of accused belligerents
will diminish when the risks to the Nation seem most serious and
tangible. If the current situation does not seem like a genuine
war, then civilian rather than military trials seem more appropri-
ate. If the stakes of the conflict are relatively low, then the justi-
fication for diminishing civil liberties and protecting secrets is
relatively weak. If 9/11 is not a genuine threat to the nation's
survival, then the usual tradeoffs of ordinary civilian trials-in
which erroneous acquittals are the price we pay for procedures
that diminish the risk of erroneous convictions -seem appropri-
ate.
Some platitudes are worth repeating: When a nation be-
lieves that its future is at risk, it will not be so careful about the
protecting the perceived interests of those who are, or who
might well be, involving in creating the relevant threat. But here
too a cautionary note is appropriate. Suppose that the threat
posed by the events of 9/11 were thought to be far greater than
they now are. Would military commissions be widely approved?
As widely as in 1942? This is doubtful. To be sure, the reaction
to military commissions would be more muted if, for example,
terrorists exploded a nuclear suitcase bomb, killing 100,000 peo-
ple. Hence the perception of a lesser threat, in 2001 and 2002, is
a contributing factor to the public reaction. But it is hardly all of
the picture.
2. Evolving Social Attitudes: Government,
the Military, and Law
It is not possible to account for the different reactions to the
Roosevelt and Bush Orders without emphasizing large social
and related legal changes within the last sixty years. President
Roosevelt acted before Vietnam, before the revelations of Hoo-
ver's domestic espionage, and before Watergate. To say the
least, this was a time when the press, Congress, and intellectuals
had a much higher regard for the Executive branch and the Mili-
tary.
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In July 1942, Arthur Krock defended the elaborate secrecy
of the Nazi saboteur trial on the following terms: "The FBI
vouches for the need of secrecy and the administration's lawyers
support the legality of the procedure. Unless these lead to clear
abuses, neither is likely to be called into broad question., 72 A
passage of this sort in the New York Times is unimaginable in
2002. In large part as a result of the disclosures and rebellions of
the 1960s and 1970s, Executive branch officers -Democrat or
Republican, liberal or conservative -receive diminished levels of
trust, at least when there is a plausible claim that civil liberties
are at risk. Compare in this regard the frequent suggestion that
President Bush's Order called for "secret military trials"-a
claim that was not supported by the Order itself, which did not
mandate secrecy.
But the cultural difference is not adequately described as
involving a mere reduction in trust. It involved at the same time
a massively strengthened commitment to individual rights, not
only within the culture but within the legal system itself. Begin
with culture: In 1942, "neither the country, nor its political and
intellectual leaders, nor such organizations as the American Civil
Liberties Union, were truly libertarian in their outlook. 7 3 In
1942, restrictions on free speech did not produce a firestorm of
public protest. Libelous speech was commonly regulated, with-
out discernible public objection. Commercial speech received no
protection at all, while sexually explicit speech was heavily con-
trolled, and there was little organized cultural opposition to
these practices. Of course this was an era of racial segregation,
and public opposition to discrimination was far more tepid than
it is today. Nor did the public insist on what we now take to be
minimal procedural safeguards for the accused. There is a large
question about why, exactly, the culture has shifted in the direc-
tion of more solicitude for civil liberties and civil liberties. Un-
doubtedly World War II itself played a role, encouraging Ameri-
can culture to attempt to distinguish itself radically from those of
regimes that did not respect freedom. We cannot fully address
the causal question here; but it is clear that the shift has been
massive.
Turn now to law: In 1942, federal constitutional law was
fundamentally different from what it is today. The Court that
72. Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Civil Rights in the Saboteurs' Trial, N.Y. Times 18
(July 21, 1942).
73. See Belknap, 89 Mil. L. Rev. at 89 (cited in note 25), see also Francis Biddle, In
Brief Authority 234-35 (Doubleday, 1962).
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wrote Quirin was the same Court that supported the Japanese
exclusion in Korematsu. Indigent defendants did not yet have a
right to counsel.7 4 Within the states, the exclusionary rule was
yet to be created.75 Police abuses had not yet been held to be
generally violative of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.76 In fact the criminal procedure revolution was
17decades away.
In addition, habeas corpus review has changed significantly
since 1942. Beginning a few months after Quirin was decided,
the Supreme Court began its dramatic extension of habeas cor-
pus from a review of jurisdictional defects in prior judicial pro-
ceedings to something closer to post-conviction federal review of
the merits of defendants' federal constitutional and statutory
claims.78 This expanded conception of habeas was the proce-
dural mechanism that made possible the extraordinary growth,
in the late 1950s and 1960s, of constitutional protections for de-
fendants in criminal cases. Although the Rehnquist Court has
cut back on the scope of habeas corpus, the writ in its modern
guise remains available for properly raised claims of constitu-
tional deprivation. Moreover, the expansion of habeas was not
limited to civilian trials. It has also extended to military trials of
U.S. service members, even ones held abroad.7 9
Finally, military justice itself has undergone a fundamental
transformation since 1942. Congress's enactment of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") in 1950 marked "the
most important development in military justice since our coun-
try's founding." 80  The Articles of War regime that governed
during World War II was a "command-dominated system... de-
signed to secure obedience to the commander, and to serve the
74. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
75. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
76. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
77. The largest symbol here is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (noting that the Court in Waley
v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942), "openly discarded the concept of jurisdiction.., as a
touchstone of the availability of federal habeas review, and acknowledged that such re-
view is available for claims of 'disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and
where the writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights."'). Other important
decisions in this line were Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); see generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 441 (1963).
79. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
80. Brigadier General (retired) John Cooke, Introduction: Fiftieth Anniversary of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Symposium Edition, 165 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 1 (2000).
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commander's will."'" Military justice during this period con-
tained few of the procedural protections of the civilian criminal
system, and was widely criticized as "harsh and arbitrary. ' 82 Fol-
lowing World War II, in which the U.S. military fought to pre-
serve American freedoms, it was widely believed that these free-
doms should extend to the military itself.
The UCMJ applied the civilian concept of procedural justice
in a way that was consistent with the special circumstances of the
military.83 The UCMJ and its successor statutes (such as the
Military Justice Act of 1968)84 established a powerful Court of
Military Appeals, independent of command structures, that
would eventually extend most conceptions of civilian due proc-
ess to military courts. The Military Justice Act of 1983 contin-
ued this trend by authorizing Supreme Court review of the Court
of Military Appeals. Today military justice remains different
from civilian justice in important respects. But as Justice Gins-
burg correctly noted in Weiss v. United States, "men and women
in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards be-
hind.., when they enter military service," for the present system
of military justice is "notably more sensitive to due process con-
cerns than the one prevailing through most of our country's his-
tory."85
In the past 60 years, in sum, the Nation has become far
more committed to the independence of the federal judiciary
and to a high degree of civil liberties and criminal procedural
protections. The legal and social world of 2001 is radically dif-
ferent from the legal and social world of 1942. In this new world,
it was much more natural to think that the displacement of civil-
ian courts in favor of a more expeditious military procedure
would offend constitutional values.
IV. ON THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
DURING WARTIME
The different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush military
commissions exemplify a persistent theme in the historical evolu-
tion of civil liberties during wartime in the United States. Dur-
81. Id. at3.
82. Id. at6.
83. See generally Jonathan Lurie, Military Justice in America: The US. Court of
Appeals for The Armed Forces, 1775-1980 (U Press of Kansas, rev ed. 2001).
84. Pub. L. No. 90-632,82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
85. 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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ing every serious war in our nation's history, civil liberties have
been curtailed. Following (usually not during) each war, elites
regret these restrictions on civil liberties because the restrictions
often seem-from the ex post perspective when the danger of
war has passed and the true extent of the threats become
known-to be unwarranted or extreme. During the next war,
the perceived abuses during the last war are used as the baseline
for determining which civil liberties restrictions are appropriate.
This dialectic produces a ratchet effect, over time, in favor of
more expansive civil liberties during wartime. Of course there is
nothing inevitable to this process. We could imagine an opposite
effect, in which a failure to provide adequate security was recog-
nized as such, in hindsight, and in which the ratchet effect
worked in the opposite direction. But in the American context,
with a remarkable record of military success, the historical trend
has been toward increasing suspicion of intrusions on civil liberty
and civil rights, even when national security seems to be at risk.
Arthur Krock of the New York Times again illustrates the
point. In a column on July 14, 1942, Krock recalled a bill pro-
posed by Senator Chamberlin during World War I to punish
spies and disloyalists by court martial. The proposal, Krock
noted, came in 1918, when "a wave of hysteria about spies and
sabotage has swept the country.,1 6 The bill died after President
Wilson opposed it on the ground that it was unconstitutional, in-
consistent "with the spirit and practice of America," and in any
event unnecessary in light of the Espionage Act and Sabotage
Act.
Krock recounted this episode in order to show, in the midst
of the saboteurs trial, that "the country seems to have grown up"
since 1918 with respect to civil liberties. "No such proposal [like
Chamberlin's] or anything remotely like it has been responsibly
put forth in Congress or among the public," he noted. He con-
tinued:
The chapter from past history confers even greater dignity on
the proceedings of the military commission [for the Nazi sabo-
teurs]. The contrast is very great between this deliberate
search for truth and justice in a case where more summary
methods might easily have been invoked and what Mr.
Chamberlain would have done to anyone merely charged with
86. Arthur Krock, When Martial Law Was Proposed for Everybody, N.Y. Times 18
(July 14, 1942).
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far lesser crimes twenty-four years ago.
87
From today's perspective, much of Krock's piece seems pe-
culiar. Wilson's favorable invocation in 1918 of the Espionage
Act in an argument protective of civil liberties appears ironic,
even weird, to the modern observer. For the Espionage Act was
amended in May 1918 to include the Sedition Act, a statute that
formed the basis of some of the most notorious, and widely re-
gretted, anti-free speech prosecutions in U.S. history.8" But the
contemporary supporters of the Sedition Act, many of whom
viewed themselves as "enlightened liberals" protective of the
First Amendment, 9 were no doubt implicitly comparing their
acts to the last great war, in which Lincoln suspended the writ of
habeas corpus, arrested civilians and tried them in military com-
missions, seized newspapers and suspended their mailing privi-
leges, and much more.9 Similarly, many today have difficulty
understanding how Krock could view a (literally) secret military
commission as a dignified and deliberate search for truth. But
Krock's claim seemed natural in 1942, for his implicit baseline of
comparison was the World War I experience.91
The Krock episode illustrates what Chief Justice Rehnquist
has described as a "generally ameliorative trend" in civil liberties
during wartime. 92 Rehnquist notes that World Wars I and II
were each, by comparison to the prior war, characterized by in-
creased congressional and judicial involvement in the protection
of civil liberties, and diminished governmental attempts to sup-
press criticism of the war effort. 93 To Rehnquist's catalogue we
add the more general point that restrictions of civil liberties that
came to be regretted after the war were never again repeated.
No President has ever repeated Lincoln's suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, his military trials for civilians in the United
States, or his brutal suppression of newspapers. We have never
again seen loyalty prosecutions as in World War I, and we are
87. Id.
88. See for example, Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
89. See Richard Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, The Supreme Court,
and Free Speech 29-36 (Viking Penguin, 1987).
90. See generally, Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and
Civil Liberties (Oxford U. Press, 1991).
91. On this general point see Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United
States, 1941-1945 at 37 (J.P. Lippincott, 1972).
92. William H. Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in Wartime 221
(Alfred A Knopf, 1998).
93. Id. at 219-21.
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unlikely to do so. The same is true of the World War II exclu-
sion of Japanese-Americans.
This brings us back to the Bush Military Order. Following
World War II, many criticized the use of some military commis-
sions during the War, especially the ones in Japan. But the
commissions were not condemned with the same vehemence,
and were not looked back upon with the same sense of shame, as
Lincoln's suspension of the writ, or the World War I speech
prosecutions, or the World War II Japanese exclusion Order. In
the post-war period, military commissions were not generally
viewed as a horrible "mistake" never to be repeated again. As
we noted above, in 1950 Congress recodified the statute that
supported the military trial of the Nazis, and in the process ap-
peared to embrace Quirin's interpretation of affirmative con-
gressional authorization for military commissions. And in sharp
contrast to, say, Korematsu, Quirin has often been cited without
embarrassment by the Supreme Court as good law.94 In this
light, it is perhaps not surprising that the Bush military commis-
sions, though subject to criticism, was not unthinkable in 2001,
and indeed attracted some support among some elites.
It remains to be seen whether the President will use military
commissions to prosecute those connected to the 9/11 attacks. If
he does not, one important reason will be the changed circum-
stances -including changed legal and cultural circumstances-
we have outlined. If he does, the commissions will look far more
like civilian courts than past commissions. Department of De-
fense regulations provide that commission trials are open except
when necessary to protect national security or the safety of par-
ticipants. The regulations also presume the innocence of the ac-
cused, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, require the
prosecutor to provide the accused with access to all evidence to
be introduced at trial, including exculpatory evidence, forbid ad-
verse inferences to be drawn from the accused's failure to testify,
94. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 246 (1998); Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U.S. 25, 34 (1976); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 768 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665,685-686 (1972); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 n. 68 (1957). By contrast, compare the treatment of
Korematsu in, for example, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., con-
curring); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989). We should note
that there was one dimension along which Quirin was deeply regretted ex post, namely,
the haste in which the decision was reached, and the unfortunate circumstance of writing
and releasing the opinion after six of the eight saboteurs had been executed. See Danel-
ski, 1 J. S. Ct. Hist. 61 (cited in note 3).
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provide the accused with a military attorney and allow him to
choose another attorney, require a 2/3 vote for conviction and a
unanimous vote for a death sentence, and require at least two
levels of review, including one level that can (but need not) con-
tain civilian judges.95 While these procedures fall short of civil-
ian standards (especially with respect to evidence rules, the jury,
and judicial review), they are in most respects like military trials
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and they provide
far greater procedural safeguards than any previous military
commission, including Nuremberg. These procedural advances
can be seen as a result of the factors we have discussed. In short,
changes in the use and structure of military commissions fit the
general trend described here:
So too do the other restrictions that the Bush administration
has placed on civil liberties. Civil libertarians have condemned
the Bush administration's monitoring of attorney-client phone
calls, its treatment of the Guantanamo prisoners, its detention of
alleged "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla as an "enemy belligerent,"
and its detentions of Muslims on technical immigration viola-
tions. We do not express a view on these practices; nothing said
here is meant to approve of them, for approval would require a
detailed analysis of each. But compared to past wars led by Lin-
coln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, the Bush administration has, thus
far, diminished relatively few civil liberties. Even a conservative
Executive branch, it seems, is influenced by the general trend
towards protections of civil liberties during wartime.
There is a potential danger here. The danger is that in an
age of anthrax, nuclear suitcases, and other easy-to-conceal
weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by al Qaeda and
other terrorists might warrant tradeoffs between liberty and se-
curity that are inconsistent with ordinary respect for civil liber-
ties. It is always difficult to gauge the seriousness of wartime
threats to security in the midst of the war. The problem is sig-
nificantly exacerbated in the context of asymmetrical warfare in-
volving suicidal terrorists. Whether the government has made
the proper tradeoff between liberty and order can be known
only ex post. The ameliorative trend in civil liberties is a testa-
ment to our extraordinary constitutional traditions and legal cul-
ture-and perhaps above all to the post-World War II shift in le-
gal understandings. It is customary, and sensible, to fear that an
95. See Department of Defense March 21, 2002, available at <http://www.
dfenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf.>.
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overestimation of the current threat will lead us to abridge civil
liberties in unjustifiable ways. But it is not senseless to fear as
well that the gravitational pull of this trend might, in this or
other circumstances, lead some to underestimate the threat we
actually face.
V. CONCLUSION
The different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush Orders il-
luminate a great deal about the relationship between war and
civil liberties, and about cultural and legal change over time. We
have argued that perceived legal differences between the Or-
ders, far from explaining the different reactions, are a product of
those different reactions. The enthusiasm for the Roosevelt Or-
der, and the critical reaction to the Bush Order, can be explained
partly by the much greater perception of threat in 1942 than in
2001. But the most powerful and instructive explanation, we
think, lies in the fact that with respect to actions of the Executive
branch that might endanger civil liberties, the Nation is now far
less trusting of government, and far more solicitous of the ac-
cused, than it was sixty years ago. This change counts as a genu-
ine revolution not only in law but also in cultural attitudes. An
exploration of the radically different attitudes toward essentially
identical legal acts is a remarkable illustration of this revolution.
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